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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I: The traditional discretion
whether and what to charge.

of a prosecutor is

Section 78-3a-25(6) allows a prosecutor

to decide whether to file, what to file and in which court to file
the charge.

Defendant's

liberty

interest

is subject to strict

scrutiny and the arbitrary and standardless decision of the prosecutor of which court to file in is not narrowily tailored to the
State's compelling interest of providing serious juvenile offenders
with lengthy supervision and protecting the public from such offenders, nor does 78-3a-25(6) meet the rational basis test.
POINT II.

The

issue

of whether

the Juvenile

Court's

denial of a Motion to Recall is a final appealable order is raised
for the first time on appeal and should not be considered by the
court.

In the alternative, an order denying recall of a juvenile

is not a final appealable order inasmuch as the denial of the
Motion does not terminate jurisdiction, does not finally foreclose
treatment as a juvenile, does not result after a full investigation
and hearing, opens the possibility for piecemeal review, does not
end the litigation or dispose of the case as to all parties on
the merits and invites delay, expense and burdens upon the court.
-1-

Even if the order is a final appealable order, the defendant's attack
of a district

court's jurisdiction based

on an unconstitutional

statute was properly brought before the district court and these
issues are preserved for appeal.
POINT III.

Conditioning the remand of a juvenile to the

Division of Youth Corrections on the approval of the Division of
Youth Corrections

after Judgment

is not a proper delegation of

legislative power. The legislature has no authority to make individual decisions, only to make rules by which individual decisions
are made.

The legislature therefore cannot delegate to the execu-

tive branch the power to determine on a case by case basis whether
juvenile treatment

for

an

individual

is appropriate.

It is a

judicial function to determine the sentence after conviction and is
a decision which cannot be delegated to the executive branch.

Even

if such delegation were proper, this delegation is not limited by
sufficient guidelines or standards and does not meet constitutional
requirements.

The issue of defendant's standing to challenge the

constitutionality of 78-3a-25(8) is raised for the first time on
appeal and should not be considered by the court.

Even if the

court considers this issue the defendant has standing to challenge
the constitionality of the direct filing statute on its face by a
Motion to Dismiss made prior to arraignment, inasmuch as the challenge went to the jurisdiction of the district court.
POINT IV.

The issues raised by respondent in Point IV.

were not before the court below and should not be considered for
the first time on appeal.

In the event the court treats these

issues, the contentions raised in Point IV. by the State are without
-2-

merit.

Because the second amended information charged the defendant

with attempted second degree homicide during the commission of an
aggravated robbery, the aggravated robbery charge merged into the
second degree homicide charge.

Even if an attempted commission of

the aggravated robbery was sufficient for conviction on the second
degree homicide charge, convicting defendant of both crimes would
amount to conviction of the defendant on both the inchoate and
principal offense, which is prohibited by 76-4-302.
aggravated robbery

charge

merged

into

second

Because the

degree

homicide,

defendant's sentence for aggravated robbery should be vacated.

The

defendant should not be penalized for the State's errors in charging
the defendant.
POINT V.

The standard suggested by the State in Point V. is

not a proper standard for amendment of informations after judgment
and verdict. In any event the defendant was substantially prejudiced
by proceeding to trial on the felony murder charge instead of the
intentional murder charge included in the third amended information
which was filed after judgment, verdict and sentence.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE COURT SHOULD HOLD THAT UTAH'S DIRECT
FILING STATUTE VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSES OF THE UNITED STATES AND UTAH STATE
CONSTITUTIONS.

All references are to Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as Amended,
unless otherwise noted.
The State

argues

that

treatment

as

a

juvenile

is a

privilege granted by the Legislature and that the Legislature can
restrict or qualify the privilege as it sees fit, so long as there
is not

involved

any arbitrary

or discriminatory
-3-

classification.

Whether juvenile treatment is a privilege or a right, laws passed
by the legislature with respect to treatment as a juvenile may not
violate constitutional provisions.

The State does not deny that

juveniles within the class are treated differently but attempts to
justify the unequal treatement of juveniles under §78-3a-25(6) on the
basis of prosecutorial discretion.
Whether or not to prosecute and what charge to file or
bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in
[the prosecutor's] discretion.
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).

A prosecutor's

traditional discretion is whether and what to charge and has not in
the past included a choice of the court in which the charge is
filed.

The court in which a charge is filed is controlled by the

charge and not by an arbitrary decision of a prosecutor.

To allow

the prosecutor to decide whether to file, what charge to file, and
in which court to file the charges would allow the prosecutor to
determine prior to a determination of guilt or innocence the possible punishment and procedural protections available to the juvenile.
§78-3-25(6) allows one juvenile charged with one of the enumerated
crimes to receive the protections of the juvenile system while a
second juvenile charged with the same crime is prosecuted in the
adult system.

The juvenile proceeded against in juvenile court

would be subject to the juvenile court's supervision until the age
of 21 , whereas the juvenile who is prosecuted as an adult may be
imprisoned for life.

The difference

in procedures and possible

punishments between the juvenile charged in adult court and the
juvenile charged in juvenile court is supposedly permissable because
of an arbitrary and standardless decision by the prosecutor as to

-4-

what procedures and punishments the juvenile faces.

Prosecutorial

discretion cannot salvage Utah's Direct Filing Statute.
The discretion of the prosecutor would not be limited by
a holding that §78-3a-25(6) is unconstitutional.

§78-3a-22 reads

in relevent part:
(1)

Proceedings in childrens1 cases are commenced
by petition.

(2) When ever the court is informed by a peace officer
or any other person that a child is or appears to be
within the court's jurisdiction, the probation department shall make a preliminary inquiry to determine
whether the interests of the public or of the child
require that further action be taken. On the basis
of the preliminary inquiry the court may authorize
filing of or request that the county attorney file a
petition . . .
The county attorney under sub-section (6) of §78-3a-25 is allowed
to file an information against a juvenile in district court only
when a petition in the case of a person 16 years of age or older
alleges one of the offenses enumerated in that section.

If after

the preliminary inquiry made pursuant to §78-3a-22(2), the juvenile
court determines that further action be taken, the statute allows
the county attorney to file a petition in the juvenile court. When
this petition is filed, the county attorney exercises his discretion of whether and what to charge.

At this point the traditional

discretion of the county attorney has been exercised.

Ttie county

attorney's discretion should not be expanded to allow him also to
decide in which court to file.

This in essence allows the county

attorney to decide the procedural protections and possible punishment of the individual.

Prosecutor's have traditionally been able

to determine the punishment to which an accused would be subject to
by choosing the charge filed against the accused.
-5-

This discretion

of the proseutor should be exercised in the same manner for juveniles,
and in fact

is exercised when the county attorney

charge to be included

selects the

in the juvenile court petition.

If the

county attorney desires to prosecute a juvenile as an adult equal
protection requires that the initial charge determine the court in
which the juvenile will be prosecuted.

The charge contained in the

petition should govern the court in which the juvenile is prosecuted,
not a second arbitrary and standardless decision of a prosecutor.
Whether or not the above actually transpired in this case is not
relevant to the Court's determination of whether or not the Utah
Direct Filing Statute is unconstitutional.
It is not what has been done but what can be done
under a statute that determines its constitutionality.
State v. Jarmillo, 83 New Mexico 800, 498 P.2d 687, 689 (1972).
The State also contends that physical liberty should not
be held to be a fundamental right invoking strict scrutiny because
if so every criminal statute would be entitled to strict scrutiny
where ever it was challenged on equal protection grounds.
assertion is not well-founded.

This

People v. Olivas, 131 Cal. Rptr. 55,

551 P.2d 375, (1976), and Matter of CH, 683 P.2d 931 (Mont. 1984),
applied strict scrutiny to cases where the length of incarceration
of the accused was in question.

A similar holding by this Court

that statutes effecting the length of incarceration of an accused
are subject to strict scrutiny would not require every criminal
statute to

be

reviewed

under

strict

challenged on equal protection grounds.

scrutiny

whenever

it was

A further distinguishing

fact in this case is that the challenged statute is a civil and not
a criminal statute.
-6-

Langmeyer v. State, 104 Idaho 53, 656 P.2d 114 (1982) and
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), cited by the State to support
the claim that even fundamental rights are not necessarily subjected
to strict scrutiny, deal with the right to travel which has been
declared fundamental.

Langmeyer and Sosna accurately stated hold

that the compelling state interest test is applied to laws impacting
the right of interstate travel that deter migration and penalize
the exercise of the right to travel.

The Langmeyer Court expressly

found that it was unlikely that the durational residency requirement
at issue would deter a potential new resident from migrating and
that the durational residency requirement did not in a constitutional sense

penalize

scrutiny was

not

the

right

triggered.

to

travel.

Therefore,

Langmeyer, at 117.

strict

The level of

scrutiny was not addressed in the Court's Sosna opinion.
Contrary to the

State's

contention, Wells v. Childrens'

Aid Society of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, (Utah 1984), did not uphold a
statute effecting
basis review.

fundamental

parental

rights

under

a rational

The Wells Court held that:

The proponent of legislation infringing parental
rights must show (1) a compelling state interest
in the result to be achieved and (2) that the means
adopted are narrowly tailored to achieve the basic
statutory purpose.
Wells at 206.

Defendant is not aware of any Utah cases holding

that something less than strict scrutiny applies when the statute
challenged effects fundamental rights.

The Court should hold as

argued in Appellant's Brief that physical liberty is a fundamental
right.

Laws having an impact on the length of incarceration of an

individual should be subject to the compelling state interest test.

-7-

The Court in the alternative should at least hold that an intermediate standard applies in this instance.
Defendant's concession that the State has a compelling
interest in treating juveniles over the age of 16 charged with the
offenses enumerated

in §78-3a-25(6) is not fatal to defendant's

equal protection attack.

Defendant does not attack the statutory

classification contained in 78-3a-25(6).

It is the unequal treat-

ment of members in a class created by the legislature that defendant
attacks.

If all juveniles charged in a juvenile court petition

with the offenses enumerated in §78-3a-25(6) were filed against in
district court, defendant would have no cause to attack the constitutionality of this statute.

Defendant's objections arise

because the 78-3a-25(6) allows differential treatment of juveniles
within the class created by §78-3a-25(6).
The reasons advanced by the State for the Direct Filing
Statute are that juveniles who have committed the serious crimes
enumerated in 78-3a-25(6) will require lengthy supervision, and are
a threat to public safety.

However, the State advances no reason

for allowing juveniles charged with the enumerated offenses to be
dealt with differently.

A statutory scheme such as 78-3a-25(6),

which allows some individuals charged in a juvenile court petition
with the enumerated offenses to remain in the juvenile system and
face certification while others have an information filed against
them directly in the district court is not narrowly tailored to
achieve the basis statutory purpose of providing those individuals
with lengthy supervision in the adult system beyond the age of 21
when the juvenile

system

loses jurisdiction.

-8-

Such a statutory

framework cannot be upheld on the basis of prosecutorial discretion.
Placing such discretion in the hands of the prosecutor in effect
amounts to a delegation of legislative authority without standards
and procedural safeguards which cannot be upheld.
Shale Oil v. Public Service Commission, 700 P.2d
1985).

White River

1088, 1091 (Utah

Tested under the compelling state interest test, the means

adopted in 78-3a-25(6) are not narrowly tailored to achLeve the
basic statutory purpose.
The defendant by failing to dispute for the purposes of a
compelling state interest

test that the State has a compelling

interest in dealing with juveniles over the age of 16 who are
charged with the offenses enumerated in §78-3a-25(6) did not intend
and has not waived his right to challenge that the direct filing
statute is unconstitutional if reviewed by the rational basis test.
The State has not set forth a rational basis for the scheme which
allows discrimination

within the

class created

by the statute.

Defendant so argued in Appellant's Brief at pages 20, 21 and 22.
Contrary to

the

State's

contentions,

§78-3a-25(6) does

allow juveniles to be treated in radically different manners.
determination made at a recall hearing provided

A

by §78-3a-25(9)

does not even closely approach the certification hearing provided
by §78-3a-25 sub-sections (1) through (5). Section 78-3a-25(9) with
its constitutional infirmaties is not a proper check on the discretion granted to the prosecutor under the statute. This is especially
so in instances such as this where the defendant's Motion for Recall
was denied.

The risk of prosecution of a juvenile in adult court

where the juvenile could be more appropriately dealt with in the

-9-

juvenile system is great here where the Recall Statute provides no
finding or determination to be made by the Juvenile Court when the
juvenile is brought before it at the recall hearing.
stitutional "safety

valve11

is

no

protection

to

the

An unconjuvenile.

§78-3a-25(6) violates the equal protection clauses of the United
States and Utah State Constitutions.
POINT II. AN ORDER DENYING RECALL IS NOT A FINAL
APPEALABLE ORDER AND DEFENDANT'S DUE
PROCESS ARGUMENTS ARE PROPERLY BEFORE
THE COURT.
The State contends that because the Juvenile Court's
Order denying the defendant 's motion to recall was not appealed by
defendant that defendant is precluded from asserting his due process
argument on appeal. The State does not attack the Court's jurdiction
in this appeal, it merely contends that the Order denying recall
was a final appealable Order and that a direct appeal should have
been taken from the Juvenile Court and that the defendant is circumventing the regular appellate process by using a Motion to Dismiss
in the Trial Court as a basis for the Court's review of defendant's
due process arguments.

The State's challenge is more accurately

couched as a challenge as to whether or not the defendant's due
process arguments are preserved for appeal.
not before the District Court below.

This contention was

The Court therefore should

not consider these arguments of the State which are raised for the
first time

on appeal.

Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d

100, 102

(Utah 1983); Pettingille v. Perkins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 272 P.2d 185,
186 (1954); State v. Loe, 732 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah 1987); State v.
Chancelor, 704 P.2d

579, 580 (Utah 1985); Lopez v. Shulsen, 716

P.2d 787, 788, 789, (Utah 1986);

State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 53

-10-

(Utah 1981); Rosenlof v. Sullivan, 76 P.2d

372, 374 (Utah 1983).

Without waiving defendant's objection to raising Point II
of Respondent's

Brief

for the

first time

on appeal, defendant

treats the issue raised in Point II of Respondent's Brief below*
The State

contends

that

a motion denying

final order from which an appeal may be taken.

recall is a

In support of its

contention the State refers to an Order of the Utah Court of Appeals
entered in State in Interest of Byrd, Utah Court of Appeals Case No.
880108-CA wherein the Court of Appeals determined that an order on
motion to recall is a final appealable order for the reasons set
forth in

State In Re Atcheson,

575

P.2d

181

Atcheson, the Court held that a certification
appealable order.
diction was

(Utah

1978).

In

order is a final

The Court relied heavily on the fact that juris-

specifically

terminated

upon

granting

the

State's

motion to certify a juvenile to adult court and that the transfer
of jurisdiction was irrevocable.

The Court also relied upon the

fact that various legislative and judicial protections were effectively and finally foreclosed by the certification order and that
a full investigation and hearing is held in a certification proceeding.

Atcheson at 182, 183. The Utah Court of Appeals' determination

while persuasive is not binding upon this Court.

For the reasons

to be stated below the Court should reverse the Decision of the
Court of Appeals and hold that an order on motion to recall jurisdiction is not a final appealable order.
The factors which the Court relied on in holding a certification order a final appealable order are not present in this
instance.

Jurisdiction in the juvenile court is terminated prior

-11-

to holding the recall hearing by the county attorney filing an
information in the district court.
is held, jurisdiction

over

At the time the recall hearing

the defendant

court and not the juvenile court.

lies

in the district

The recall hearing is not a full

investigation and hearing, rather, it is a cursory determination
wherein the age of the defendant, the seriousness of offense, and
the record

of the defendant

are taken

into

consideration.

In

addition, the legislative protections that have been developed for
the juvenile are not effectively and finally foreclosed by an order
denying recall.

§78-3a-25(8) if found constitutional allows the

district court an opportunity to commit a juvenile to the care,
custody and jurisdiction of the Division of Youth Corrections. The
reasoning of

Atcheson

is not

applicable to the

case

at hand.

The Court has said that:
Parties to a suit generally are entitled to only
one appeal as a matter of right . . .
an appeal
can be taken only from the entry of the judgment
that finally concludes the action.
All Weather Insulation v. Amiron Development Corp., 702 P.2d 1176,
1177, 1178 (Utah 1985).

A final judgment is one which ends the

litigation and leaves no claim remaining for resolution.

Tippetts

v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 738 P.2d 635, 635 (Utah 1987).
A judgment to be final must dispose of the case
as to all the parties, and finally dispose of the
subject matter of the litigation on the merits of
the case . . . A final judgment is a judgment which
ends the controversy between the parties litigating.
North Point Consolidated Irrigation Co. v. Utah & Salt Lake Canal
Co., 46 P. 824, 826 (Utah 1896).

As can be seen an Order denying

recall does not finally conclude the action in the district court.
The issue as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant remains to
-12-

be litigated.

Nor does an Order denying recall dispose of the case

as to all the parties or finally dispose of the subject matter of
the litigation on the merits.

At the termination of the recall

hearing the controversy between the State and the defendant remained
outstanding.

At the point when the recall hearing was denied the

litigation was far from terminated.
The policy of the laws of the several states and
of the United States is to prevent unnecessary
appeals. It is not the policy of the courts to
review cases by piecemeal. The interest of litigants
require that cases shall not be prematurely brought
to the highest court. The errors complained of may
be corrected in the court in which they originated;
or the party injured by them might notwithstanding
the injury have final judgment in his favor.
If a
judgment interlocutory in its nature were the subject
of appeal, each of the judgments rendered in the case
could be brought before the appellate court, and
litigants harassed by useless delay and expense,
and the courts burdened with unnecesasry labor.
. . . The reason of the Rule is obvious. A party
against whom an interlocutory order is made may
have all his wrongs redressed and his rights
protected upon a final hearing, and therefore he
has no ground of complaint.
If his rights are not
protected on a final hearing in the trial court,
the error can be corrected on appeal from the
final judgment.
North Point Consolidated Irrigation Co., at 827. The points brought
out in the above quoted passage are equally applicable here. Judicial economy necessitates that cases not be reviewed piecemeal.
This is a real possibility in the context of a recall hearing.

In

the event the motion to recall is denied, the defendant is then
entitled to appeal the Court's decision.

If the Juvenile Court's

recall order is reversed on appeal and the defendant is remanded to
juvenile custody, the defendant may then be subjected to a certification hearing.

78-3a-25(9).

In the event the defendant is certi-

fied to the district court, under Atcheson he may appeal the certi-13-

fication order.

This would result in unnecessary delay, expense and

burdens upon the Court that the rule against piecemeal review is
designed to prevent.
A holding that the denial of a motion to recall jurisdiction is a final appealable order would allow an appeal from the
Juvenile Court which has no jurisdiction and puts more emphasis on
determining the penalty the juvenile will be subjected to than the
primary purpose of the adjudication of the guilt or innocence of the
defendant.

An order denying recall disposes merely of a threshold

jurisdictional issue and should be held to be interlocutory in
nature.
A holding by the Court that an Order denying a motion
for recall is a final appealable order is not fatal to defendant's
due process challenge.
to Dismiss

specifically

The District Court's Ruling on the Motion
stated

that the District

Court had no

appellate jurisdiction over the decision of the Juvenile Court. (R.
83).

The determination made by the District Court on defendant's

Motion to Dismiss, whi h was ordered by the trial judge (R. 88),
was that the statute upon which the District Court had taken jurisdiction was constitutional.

Defendant's challenge below goes to

the District Court's jurisdiction based on the constitutionality of
78-3a-25(6), (8) and (9). The Court's ruling on defendant's Motion
to Dismiss reserved the issue of the constitutionality of §78-3a25(9).

Contrary

to the contention of the State, defendant may

attack the constitutionality of the recall of jurisdiction statute
on its face.
It is not what has been done but what can be done
under a statute that determines its constitutionality.
-14-

State v. Jarmillo, 83 New Mexico 800, 498 P.2d
The defendant's

due

process

687, 687 (1972).

arguments

are

properly

before the Court and the Court should determine them.

Section

78-3a-25(9), as well as the sentencing provisions of §78-3a-25(8)
act as checks on 78-3a-25(6) and are such integral parts of the
Direct Filing Statute that consideration of the constitutionality
of the Direct Filing Statute cannot properly be considered while
excluding consideration of the recall and sentencing provisions.
POINT III.

SECTION 78-3a-25(8) IS NOT A PROPER
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER AND
DEFENDANT HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE
ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY.

The State seeks to uphold §78-3a-25(8) on the grounds
that requiring approval of the Division of Youth Corrections before
a juvenile defendant

can be committed to the Division of Youth

Correction's custody is a proper delegation of legislative power.
The State also claims that the defendant has no standing to challenge
78-3a-25(8)?s constitutionality.

These issues are raised for the

first time in Respondent's Brief and should not be considered by
the Court.

Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983);

Pettlngille v. Perkins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 272 P.2d 185, 186 (1954);
State v. Loe, 732 P.2d

115, 117 (Utah 1987); State v. Chancelor,

704 P.2d 579, 580 (Utah 1985); Lopez v. Shulsen, 716 P.2d 787, 788,
789, (Utah 1986); State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 53 (Utah 1981); Rosenlof v. Sullivan, 76 P.2d 372, 374 (Utah 1983).
Without waiving defendant's

objection to the Court's

consideration of the State's arguments raised in Point III for the
first time on appeal, defendant addresses the issues below:
The State claims that 78-3a-25(8) does not violate Utah's
-15-

Separation of Powers clause because it is within the power of the
legislature to determine the appropriate sentencing

alternatives

that will be available to Judges and the legislature has delegated
to the Division of Youth Corrections the power to determine the
appropriate placement of juveniles in the interest of the juvenile
and the public.

Respondent's

Brief, page

9.

While

defendant

agrees that it is within the power of the legislature to determine
the appropriate sentencing alternatives that will be available to
Judges, it is a judicial function to decide a defendant's punishment
after conviction among the alternatives given by the legislature.
State v. Jones, 689 P.2d 561, 564 (Ariz.

App.

1984).

The legis-

lature has the power to make, amend or repeal laws, the executive
department enforces laws, and the judiciary interprets and applies
the law in actual controversies.
426, P.2d 223, 235, (1976).

Vansickle v. Shanahan, 212 Kan.

The legislature has the power to make

the law, but the judiciary has the power to interpret and apply the
law in actual

controversies.

The legislature

therefore has no

power to determine the appropriate placement of juveniles on an
individual basis.

The legislature therefore not having the power

to make individual decisions regarding an accused's sentence cannot
delegate that judicial function to the Division of Youth Corrections.
The legislature in essence has delegated the authority to determine
the punishment of an individual to the executive branch of government.

This is clearly a judicial function and inpermissable under

the separation of powers doctrine.

It is the Division of Youth

Corrections' Duty to execute a juvenile's sentence, not determine
it.

-16-

[W]hen the decision to prosecute has been made,
the process which leads to acquittal or sentencing is
fundamentally judicial in nature, or, to state it another
way, when the jurisdiction of a court has been properly
invoked by the filing of a criminal charge, the disposition of that charge becomes a judicial responsibility.
. . . [T]he decision to mitigate a sentence properly
belongs to the Judge . . .
State v. Jones, supra.
While it is within the power of the legislature to determine the appropriate sentencing alternatives available to Judges,
and the legislature can remove all discretion from a Judge in the
imposition of a sentence, the legislature cannot take that discretion away from the Court and give it to another branch of government.
A holding that conditioning a remand of the convicted juvenile to
the Division of Youth Corrections on the approval of the Division
of Youth Corrections does not violate the Constitution, is tantamount to telling the legislature that it may condition all of the
court's sentences of convicted defendants on the approval of adult
probation and parole.
of Youth

Corrections

While it would be prudent for the Division
to evaluate a juvenile defendant prior to

sentencing and provide the court with its opinion as to whether
treatment in the juvenile system is appropriate, once a sentencing
alternative is given to the court it may not be unconstitutionally
conditioned.
Even if as

the

State

suggests, the

legislature

could

properly delegate to the executive branch the discretion to choose
the appropriate placement of juveniles on an individual basis, the
delegation contained

in

78-3a-25(8) is not a proper delegation

supported by sufficient standards and procedural safeguards.

In

order for a legislative delegation to survive constitutional scru-17-
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See also

Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. State Department of

Revenue, 105 Wash. 2nd 318, 715 P.2d

123, 128 (1986).

(If the

issue of standing is not submitted to the trial court, it may not
be considered

on appeal) ; Torrez v. State Farm Mutual Automobile

Insurance Company, 130 Ariz. 223, 635 P.2d 511, 513, Footnote 2
(Ariz. App. 1981) (Standing may not be raised for the first time on
appeal).
In any event the defendant has standing to challenge the
constitutionality of 78-3a-25(8) inasmuch as defendant's motion to
dismiss, wherein the

constitutionality

District Court's jurisdiction

was

of this statute and the

challenged

was made prior to

arraignment after the trial court ordered counsel to do so.
88).

The issue is properly reserved for appeal.

(R.

A challenge of

the entire direct filing system on its face prior to arraignment is
an appropriate method to attack the constitutionality of the direct
filing statute and the jurisdiction of the District Court, inasmuch
as 78-3a-25(6) is tempered

by both subsections 8 and 9.

These

sections are so inter-related that the court should consider the
constitutionality of the entire statute.

The court should also

grant standing to the defendant because the issues involved in the
constitutionality of 78-3a-25(6), (8), and (9) are of great public
importance and ought to be judicially resolved.

See Olson v. Salt

Lake City School District, 724 P.2d 960, 962, (Utah 1986) (Footnote
1).
POINT IV.

AGGRAVATED ROBBERY IS AN INCLUDED
OFFENSE OF ATTEMPTED SECOND DEGREE HOMICIDE AND THE AGGRAVATED ROBBERY COUNT OF
THE INFORMATION MERGED INTO THE ATTEMPTED
SECOND DEGREE HOMICIDE CHARGE.
-19-
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cause the death of another person.

(R. 32, 33). The court in order

to convict the defendant of attempted second degree homicide under
the second amended information was required to find a completed
aggravated robbery as charged in Count I of the second amended
information.

76-5-203(1)(d) states:

Criminal homicide constitutes
degree if the actor; . . .

murder

in

the

second

(d). While in the commission, attempted commission or immediate flight from the commission or
attempted commission of aggravated robbery . . . causes
the death of another person. .
While theoretically under this section a completed aggravated robbery would not be required for conviction of felony murder
in the second degree, the State chose to charge defendant with
attempting to cause the death of another person while in the commission of an aggravated robbery.

As charged, proof of a completed

aggravated robbery was required to convict defendant of attempted
second degree homicide.
Even if

the

court

finds

that

a

completed

aggravated

robbery was not necessary in order to find the defendant guilty
of attempted

second

degree

homicide,

the

completed

aggravated

robbery of which defendant was convicted would still merge into
the crime of attempted second degree homicide as charged by the
State below.

Utah Code Annotated, 76-4-302 states:

No person shall be convicted of both an inchoate and
principal offense or of both attempt to commit an offense
and a conspiracy to commit the same offense.
76-4-302 prohibits defendant in this action from being convicted
of both attempted second degree homicide based on the predicate
offense of attempted aggravated robbery and the offense of aggra-

-21-

arr

' -•'

°^

defendant
robbery
-

'

.

t^tl

*

!

f

attempted
'

i

r

V

* p *

'

.

diiu p r i n c i p a l

«.nvi

f

-

«
:.

.,.vli

a^iius

offense

ue s t a

greats:

Stat e

ag^rav

:

*-.
.u-

~oi v.vH *n^ -i

and woulu

amount

\:olat)»w-#
~

«erv.
the

an.", u

•
,^^aie

.oubie jeopard}

vou.d

«. :v

degree

benienoe
" •* <-•

v

thM

defendant

..egislatively

u: •

s"-.,'...
i^

"•

-.._-.

10. a f 1 O r

* :!

IIJA^L-I,
,' ( -

.:

*'-at I

First degree murder basec
j r e d u . ; U u,icii&e
ox a^;ravated robbery stands 1;;
greater relationship
to the lesser included offense of aggravated
robbery.
If the greater erin.*
id proven then fhp IPCO.V-i~e
merges int~ i; .
1^ * crime of

, ~K, *

.r

aggrava T *H

• i

-!-al ier ,

predicate

offense

Lrom

r>!

.<-..*.-.w.. .

being

a ,.:rdVd'

attempted .?ecc"! do*

c;nvict^*i

should he

\\u r

oecaust

*

o

the d^ravat* J r,-o—, --

.

.--.-NDING
JUDGMENT
PROCESS,
RIGHT TO
CAUSE OF

State

•

^: .J.LLL.
i^^.

i.u*

-r •,«•"•-

'•>< penalized

^
.cuing

I

r.

r. eLj*
for

_:.u

THE INFORMAllUN AFTER VERUILI ^
AND SENTENCE VIOLATED DUE
EQUAL PROTECTION AND DEFENDANT'S
BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND
THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM:

*
- i-. * iK

\

*^-^

i. charging the defendant

POINT

It

r~ 1 -

here ! n^ ^ -rdVd.in^ c.rc^s:. iiut

ioDDci^ *

Sf i! i«"fi erruis

a^<

*

second degree homicide. defend'iV*

11

.a

at t err/1 *" ' ^
iciiuatii

..e

-

r«*bb*-

* -L. : 1

-.

_n.

double

dliiCndliieii t S

•22-

-

: ii

jt^pare
LU

1

i+

-

nmendru ~t
-

roc^ss
r

erdict as long

as the defendant's

substantial

prejudiced and no new offense is charged.

rights are not

This is the same standard

underwhich pre-verdict amendments are allowed under 77-35-4(d).

If

the legislature had intended that amendments to informations after
verdict would be allowed if the substantial rights of the defendant
were not prejudiced

and

no additional

or different

offense is

charged the legislature would have so stated in Section 77-35-4(d).
However, the legislature specifically mandated that after verdict
an information may be amended so as to state the offense with such
particularity as to bar a subsequent prosecution

for the same

offense upon the same set of facts.
The cases cited by the State in support of the standard
suggested by the State for post verdict amendments to informations
do not support adoption of the suggested standard.

In People v.

Johnson, 644 P. 2d 34 (Colo. App. 1981) the defendant moved for
dismissal of the charge at the close of the Peoplefs case, on the
basis that the information did not properly charge the offense.
The prosecution then moved to amend the information, which Motion
was granted over defendant's objection.

Id. at 37.

The facts of

Johnson nowhere specifically state that the information was amended
after judgment, sentence and verdict as in the instant case.

The

Johnson court states:
When amendment of an information is sought after
trial, as in this case, it may only be permitted if it
is one of form which does not prejudice any substantial
rights of the defendant.
In support of this statement the court cites Collins v. People,
69 Colo. 353,

195 P 525

(1920).

Collins v. People allowed an

information to be amended upon motion of the State made during the
-23-
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t]eu;;jaiit

was

sub-

subjected to double jeopardy because of the amended information.
Defendant has been convicted of attempted felony murder and attempted
intentional murder.

Presently there are two judgments outstanding,

neither having been vacated.

Defendant's substantial rights having

been prejudiced, the court should hold that amendment of the information after judgment and sentence violated double jeopardy, due
process and defendant's

right to be informed of the nature and

cause of the accusation against him.
CONCLUSION
The defendant respectfully requests that the relief
requested in appellant's brief be granted.
DATED this 19th day of August, 1988.
HARDING & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
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M
Attorney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I delivered FOUR (4) true and correct
copies of the foregoing Reply Brief this 19th day of August, 1988,
to:

David L. Wilkinson, Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capitol,

Salt Lake City, UT 84114.

_z
Secretary

-25-

